One of the ways to model contraction functions for belief sets is epistemic entrenchment. The first step was provided by Gärdenfors in [5] , who defined epistemic entrenchment and a contraction function in terms of it and related the latter with the AGM contraction function. Later Hans Rott in [16] presented an entrenchment based contraction function that does not satisfy recovery. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of Rott Contraction. 1
Introduction

"Even if all sentences in a knowledge set are accepted or considered as facts, this does not means that all sentences are of equal value for planning or problem solving purposes. Certain pieces of knowledge and belief about the world are more important than others when planning future actions, conducting scientific investigations or reasoning in general. We will say that some sentences in a knowledge system have a higher degree of epistemic entrenchment than others. The degree of entrenchment will, intuitively, have a bearing on what is abandoned from a knowledge set and what is retained, when a contraction or revision is carried out."
This is the key idea of epistemic entrenchment introduced by Gärdenfors in [5] . Using epistemic entrenchment, Gärdenfors defines an operation of contraction that satisfies the entire set of AGM contraction postulates [5, 6] . However, epistemic entrenchment also allows us to define entrenchment based contraction functions that do not satisfy all the AGM postulates. One of the more important such functions in the literature was proposed by Hans Rott in [16] and has been called Rott contraction. This contraction differs from the Gärdenfors contraction in not satisfying the controversial postulate of recovery. For discussions of recovery see [3, 12, 9, 10, 11, 7, 15, 14, 13] . In [11] Lindström and Rabinowicz suggest that any realistic entrenchment-based contraction operator should lie between those of Rott and Gärdenfors. We give here an axiomatic characterization for Rott's entrenchment-based contraction operator, i.e. a characterization of the lower limit of what Lindström and Rabinowicz regard as reasonable contraction. In Section 2 we recall AGM contraction functions, introduce epistemic entrenchment, relate it to AGM contraction, and also present Rott contraction. In Section 3 we provide the promised axiomatic characterization of Rott contraction. Proofs are in the appendix.
After this work was finished we were informed that another axiomatic characterization has been independently obtained by Hans Rott and Maurice Pagnucco and will be published in a joint paper by these authors [17] .
Background
AGM contraction
The logic of theory change was introduced into philosophical logic and artificial intelligence a little over a decade ago. The initial step was provided by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson in [1] (commonly called the AGM model). Basically, in the AGM model the beliefs of a rational agent are represented by a belief set K, closed under logical consequence Cn, where Cn satisfies the Tarski conditions
We assume that Cn includes classical logical consequence, satisfies the rule of introduction of disjunction into premises and is compact. We write x for x ∈ Cn(∅).
A theory is understood to be any set K of proposition closed under Cn, i.e. such that
Let L be the set of all the sentences of the language. Let K the set of all theories of the language. The expansion function + from K × L to K is defined by (K + x) = Cn(K ∪ {x}). The postulates for the AGM contraction are:
Epistemic entrenchment
The idea of entrenchment for theories was introduced by Gärdenfors in [5] to represent formally a preference ordering between formulae in a theory. He attempted to define the contraction of a theory by a sentence in terms of an order of the sentences, and identify the properties that the order must satisfy for the generated contraction to satisfy the AGM postulates.
Gärdenfors proposed the following set of axioms for the order among sentences:
A relation satisfying (EE1) − (EE5) is a standard entrenchment ordering. Furthermore, he showed that entrenchment orderings can be connected with contraction functions by the following equivalences 2 :
Gärdenfors' entrenchment-based contraction (− G ) y ∈ K−x if and only if y ∈ K and, either x or x < K (x ∨ y). Hans Rott [16] has remarked that the comparison x < K (x ∨ y) is not intuitive, and proposed the following alternative definition of a contraction operation from an entrenchment ordering:
Rott's entrenchment-based contraction (− R ) y ∈ K−x if and only if y ∈ K and, either x or x < K y.
Rott also provided the following result: Rott [16, p. 169] proved that for all x, K− R x ⊆ K− G x. Lindström and Rabinowicz [11] have proposed that a reasonable entrenchment based contraction operation − should lie between Rott's operation and Gärdenfors' operation, in the sense that
An axiomatic characterization of Rott contraction
In section 2.2 we recalled that Hans Rott proved that his contraction satisfies all the AGM postulates except recovery. In this section we provide it with an axiomatic characterization. We make use of the following postulates:
If x ∈ Cn(∅) then K−x = K (Failure) [4] .
Now we can characterize Rott Contraction in terms of postulates: Other interesting postulates are: If x and y, then either x ∈ K−y or y ∈ K−x (Expulsiveness) [8] .
The following relations hold:
Observation 3.2 Let K be a belief set and − an operator from K × L to K. Then:
1. If − satisfies strong inclusion then it satisfies conjunctive inclusion.
If − satisfies inclusion, failure and strong inclusion then it satisfies vacuity.
3. If − satisfies closure, success and strong inclusion then it satisfies expulsiveness.
If
− satisfies inclusion, failure, strong inclusion and expulsiveness then it satisfies linearity.
5.
If − satisfies closure, success, extensionality and strong inclusion then it satisfies linear hierarchical ordering.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1 Part 1: Closure, inclusion, success, extensionality and conjunctive overlap follow from observation 2.3.
Converse conjunctive inclusion:
Let K−(x ∧ y) ⊆ K−y. We have two cases: 1. y ∈ K−y: It follows from success that y. 2. y ∈ K−y: then y ∈ K−(x ∧ y). It follows from (− R ) that y ∈ K or (y ≤ K x ∧ y and x ∧ y). We have two subcases 2.1. y ∈ K: then by inclusion (see observation 2.3) Strong inclusion: Let x ∈ K−y. By (− R ) x ∈ K or ( y and x ≤ K y). We have two subcases: 1. x ∈ K: then K−x = K (since by observation 2.3, − satisfies vacuity); then K−y ⊆ K−x (since by observation 2.3, − satisfies inclusion). 2. x ∈ K: then ( y and x ≤ K y) Let z ∈ K−y, then (by (− R )) z ∈ K and y < K z.
For one direction let x ≤ K y and x ∈ K−(x ∧ y). We need to prove x ∧ y. By (− R ) we have: x ∈ K−(x ∧ y) if and only if x ∈ K and either x ∧ y or x ∧ y < K x. Therefore: x ∧ y or x ∧ y < K x. Let x ∧ y < K x: then, by (EE3), y ≤ K x ∧ y; and since x ≤ K y, we have by (EE1) that x ≤ K (x∧ y), contradiction, hence x ∧ y. For the second direction we have two subcases: 1.
x ∧ y, then y, hence by (EE2), x ≤ K y. This completes the proof. 
⇐)
1. Let y ∈ K and x. By failure K−x = K then y ∈ K−x. 2. Let y ∈ K and x < K y. By (C ≤) x ∈ K−(x ∧ y), then by strong inclusion K−(x ∧ y). For reductio ad absurdum let y ∈ K−x; then y ∈ K−(x ∧ y) then by (C ≤), y ≤ K x. Contradiction.
